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I. JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT
This appeal is taken from an order entered by the Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron
County, State of Utah, on January 23, 1990; an Order of Dismissal denying McClellan's request
to file a cross claim and third party claims entered December 27, 1991; and an Order denying
McClellan's Motion to Reconsider and Set Aside Judgment Pursuant to Rule 54(b) entered on
January 17, 1992. Jurisdiction is proper under Utah Code Annotated § 78-2-2 and Rule 3, Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED
1. Did the District Court err in granting judgment on the pleadings finding McClellan
personally liable on a promissory note when his answer clearly raised the defense that the note
was signed only in his corporate capacity? STANDARD OF REVIEW: Question of law reviewed
for correctness.

Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; St. Benedict's Div. Co. v. St.

Benedict's Hospital 811 P.2d 194 (Ut. 1991).
2. Did the District Court err in granting judgment on the pleadings when McClellan,
in a specific affidavit, pointed to discoverable evidence he had not been given an opportunity to
obtain that would establish his defense? STANDARD OF REVIEW: Question of law reviewed for
correctness. Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: St. Benedict's Div. Co. v. St. Benedict's
Hospital 811 P.2d 194 (Ut. 1991).
3. Did the District Court err in denying McClellan's request to set aside judgment
when the undisputed evidence showed that Plaintiff had violated the one action rule by failing to
preserve and foreclose a real estate mortgage securing the debt? STANDARD OF REVIEW:
Question of law reviewed for correctness. Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure; Barber v.
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Farmer's Ins. Exchange 751 P.2d 248 (Utah Ct. Ap. 1988).
4. Did the District Court abuse its discretion in refusing to allow McClellan to amend
his answer and assert a cross claim against a co-defendant who signed the same note in the
same manner as McClellan when no trial date had been established, no discovery cutoff had been
established and no motion cutoff had been established? STANDARD OF REVIEW: Abuse of
discretion. Rule 13, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure: Girard v. Appleby 660 P.2d 245 (Ut. 1983).
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS. STATUTES. ORDINANCES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. §78-38-1 provides:
There can be one action for the recovery of any debt or the
enforcement of any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate
which action must be in accordance with the provisions of this
chapter, [requiring exhaustion of remedies against security]
Utah Rule of Civ. Pro. 12(c) provides:
After the Pleadings are closed but within such time as not to delay the
trial, any party may move for judgment on the pleadings. If, on a
motion for judgment on the pleadings, matters outside the pleadings
are presented to and not excluded by the court, the motion shall be
treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as provided in
Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to
present all material pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56.
Utah Rule of Civ. Pro. 13(f) provides:
A pleading may state as a cross-claim any claim by one party against
a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject-matter either of the original action or of a counterclaim therein
or relating to any property that is the subject-matter of the original
action. Such cross-claim may include a claim that the party against
whom it is asserted is or may be liable to the cross-claimant for all or
part of the claim asserted in the action against the cross-claimant.
Utah Rule of Civ. Pro. 15 provides:
A party may amend his pleading once as a matter of course at any
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time before a responsive pleading is served or, if the pleading is one
to which no responsive pleading is permitted and the action has not
been placed upon the trial calendar, he may so amend it at any time
within 20 days after it is served. Otherwise a party may amend his
pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse
party; and leave shall be freely given when justice so requires. A party
shall plead in response to an amended pleading within 10 days after
service of the amended pleading, whichever period may be the longer,
unless the court otherwise orders.
Utah Rule of Civ. Pro. 54(b) provides:
When more than one claim for relief is presented in an action, whether
as a claim, counterclaim, cross-claim, or third-party claim, and/or
when multiple parties are involved, the court may direct the entry of a
final judgment as to one or more but fewer than all of the claims or
parties only upon an express determination by the court that there is
no just reason for delay and upon an express direction for the entry
of judgment. In the absence of such determination and direction, any
order or other form of decision, however designated, which
adjudicates fewer than all the claims or rights and liabilities of fewer
than all the parties shall not terminate the action as to any of the
claims or parties, and the order or other form of decision is subject to
revision at any time before the entry of judgment adjudicating all the
claims and the rights and liabilities of all the parties. (Emphasis added)
Utah Rule of Civ. Pro. 56(f) provides:
Should it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion
that he cannot for reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential
to justify his opposition, the court may refuse the application for
judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be
obtained or depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may
make such other order as is just.
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This appeal arises from the default of Callistoga Corporation ("Callistoga") on a loan
made to Callistoga by Horizon Savings and Loan. [Record 2] Mountain America took over
Horizon Savings and Loan after it went into receivership. [Record 2] The loan was made on June
5,1984, and total payment on the loan was due on September 9,1984. [Record 4] The loan was
3

secured by real property located in Cedar City, Utah. [Record 142] The loan was evidenced by
a promissory note signed by officers of Callistoga: Randy Hoyt, President, and Robert E.
McClellan, Secretary. [Record 4] Both Hoyt and McClellan signed the promissory note a second
time as officers of the corporation. [Record 4] A factual inquiry by the court into the purpose of
the second signature has never been conducted. [Trans. Dec. 3, 1991 p. 8]
Mountain America brought an action on July 20, 1989, against Hoyt and McClellan,
as co-defendants, seeking recovery based on the theory that they were personal guarantor's of
the loan.1

[Record 2]

McClellan answered the complaint on September 12, 1989, admitted

signing the note, but asserted that his signing of the note "was in his capacity as the secretary
of the Callistoga Court Club, Inc." [Record 9, 10] McClellan also pled as an affirmative defense
that "Plaintiff's Complaint asserts a liability for a Promissory Note which is a corporate liability not
a personal liability, and the Defendant Robert E. McClellan is being sued personally." [Record 9]
On November 6, 1989, Mountain America filed a Motion for Judgment on the
Pleadings asserting that McClellan's answer "does not deny the debt alleged... nor does it state
other legal defenses to Plaintiff's claim." [Record 15] Without a hearing, the district court entered
an order in favor of Mountain America on January 23, 1990. [Record 41]

Hoyt filed a motion to dismiss on September 6, 1989. [Record 7]. Notwithstanding Hoyt's motion,
Mountain America then sought, and the court granted, a default judgment against Hoyt. [Record 29] Hoyt
then moved to set aside the default judgment, which the court granted. [Record 89] Although the court
set aside the default judgment, Hoyt remained before the court and Mountain America was provided the
opportunity to bring an action against him. [Record 89] That Hoyt was a party to the underlying action was
made clear when the Utah Supreme Court dismissed an appeal filed by McClellan because Hoyt was still
a defendant before the trial court. [Record 108] Neither Hoyt nor Mountain America took further action in
the case until McClellan sought to bring a cross-claim against Hoyt based on the fact that if McClellan had
any liability on the note, Hoyt had the exact same liability. [Record 111] Hoyt then moved to have
Mountain America's claim against him dismissed and to have McClellan's cross claim denied. [Record 134]
Mountain America did not oppose Hoyt's motion. The court dismissed Hoyt, without prejudice. [Record
176].

4

Mountain America garnished McClellan's bank account and initiated supplemental
proceedings to collect on the Judgment in late August 1990. [Record 54-57] It was then that
McClellan found out for the first time that the Judgment had been entered. [Record 60] Proper
notice of judgment pursuant to rule 58A was not served. [Record 43, 56, 62, 83] He then filed
for a protective order and brought a Motion to Set Aside the Judgment. As part of this motion,
McClellan's counsel, James Shumate, filed an affidavit stating he had important evidence that
controverted Mountain America's claim.2 [Record 81] The evidence that Shumate presented
regarded Hoyt's recollection of the signing of the promissory note. [Record 81-83] Shumate
averred that Hoyt informed him that the "second set of signatures on the Promissory Note were
placed there by himself and Mr. McClellan and that they were placed there at the direction of the
officers of Horizon Thrift and were not to represent a personal liability on the note." [Record 83]
With that information, McClellan moved the court to set aside the Judgment. [Record 74]
At the hearing on the motion held on October 2, 1990, Counsel for Mountain
America stated for the first time that Mountain America based its Motion of November 1989 on
an answer to a request for admission. [Trans. 10] There is nothing in the record to support
counsel's assertion. Not in the motion, not in the memorandum in support of the motion, nor
anywhere else since the motion was decided without oral argument. [Record 15-17] In fact, the
Motion filed, contrary to the assertions made by Mountain America's counsel, was captioned as
a motion for Judgment on the Pleadings, not a motion for Summary Judgment. [Record 15] The

2

. In the affidavit, Shumate stated that he was unaware prior to August 1990 that Hoyt was represented
by counsel and had been served in this case. [Record 82] He also stated that Mountain America had failed
to provide the co-defendants copies of pleadings that had been filed against the other defendant. [Record
82] Thus, both parties were unaware that the other was involved in the proceeding. [Trans. Oct. 2, 1990
Hearing p. 15]

5

substance of the motion and the supporting memorandum was that there were no controverted
facts on the pleadings and therefore judgment was proper 3 Nor does the order of the court
dated January

include a reference to the admission

[Record 1 Ill]

As noted above, prior to the hearing on October 2, 1990, McClellan's attorney filed
an affid
of Horizon First Thrift had informed him and McClellan that their signatures did not create personal
liability. [necL

*

...

jpen court that he had been unable to secure an affidavit

of Hoyt at that time. [Trans. Hearing Oct 2, 1990 p.8] The district court denied McClellan's
motion to set aside the judgment. [Record 89] The trial court found that there was no admissible
evidence to support McClellan's claim that there was i mo personal liability
October 2, 1990 p. 13] Although the trial court recognized that from the face of the note it could
fc

j i I : ,i 11 i | in mi mi "in ni 1II mi I'liiii i si1 ill III ni

mi i

accept the proffer of evidence made in Shumate's affidavit that Hoyt would testify that the bank
officers

signatures did i lot create persoi lal liability. [ rrans. Hearing October

2, 1990 p. 13] Nor did the court allow additional time to procure an affidavit of Hoyt to support
the assertion made in Shumate's affidavit.
McClellan filed

II 11II ||

IIII m II Hall "' ii i| >i ei i it < i in rt

dismissed the appeal because defendant Hoyt was still before the district court, and therefore
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* * •*• entire u-xi of the Motion for Judgment is as follows:

COMES NOW the Plaintiff and moves the court for judgment against Defendant Robert E. McClellan
in the principal sum of $40192.63, together with interest, costs and attorney's fees as appropriate, pursuant
to Rule 12(c), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, on the grounds that the Answer does not deny the debt and
no genuine issue as to a material fact remains to be tried.
Plaintiff requests that the court rule on this Motion without oral argument pursuant to Rule 4-501,
Ri lies of Practice.
I

there was no appealable final judgment. [Record 108]
In November 1991, McClellan's counsel was informed by Mountain America, for the
first time, that the loan to Callistoga had been secured by real property. [Record 142] Because
Hoyt was still before the trial court, and there had been no motion or discovery cut-off, McClellan

new counsel that the loan was secured by real property. [Record 138] Specifically McClellan
niiiniuil Hit1 iJLiimiII 11 ii.'cuii IIIIUMI lllllii iiiliilui uluiy |inli|i m lent against McClellan because Mountain m
America had taken no steps to exhaust the real property collateral prior to seeking recovery on
the promissory note iii violation of Utah's one-action

[Record 138]

Mountain America

responded to the motion foi reconsideration by stating without any evidence that a foreclosure
by a first trust deed holder "foreclosed out the interest of [Mountain America] before the instant

statement was false because the trust deed that was foreclosed had a later recording date than
Muu

>i in itaii ni

:!l

ni i i Ei ni iiiicci v i

IIK

I ni Dldei

[Itecoiell

179-180] McClellan filed an affidavit and exhibits to support this argument [Record 181] Without
a hearing and without stating the basis for its decision, the district court denied ycQellan's Motion
to Reconsider. [Record 220] No decision was made on which lienholder had first priority.
Contemporaneous with the Motion to Set Aside, McClellan filed a cross-claim against

signed the exact document in the same manner. [Record 121] He also sought to bring third
party complaints against Callistoga < \t HI | H HI aii HI HI, I i Iward Burgess, Jen y Il II „»utz ar id Charles Bess
all of whom where shareholders in Callistoga. [Record ., .j ,«**,. oral argument on the motion,
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the district court denied McClellan's motion without prejudice stating that any claim against Hoyt
could be brought in a separate proceeding, [ j r a n s . Hearing o n Dec. 3, 1991 p I 4 | McClellan
appeals from the original January 23, 1990 interlocutory judgment, the order of dismissal entered
December 27, 1991, and t h e denial of the motion t o reconsider entered January 17 1992
V:1 SUMMARY O F i HE A R G U M E N T
The trial court erred as a matter of law w h e n it granted Mountain America's Motion
fc

In id(|i lie!1! il r; r i III i< • II leadings is i ily appropriate

where there is no disputed facts o n the face of the pleadings. Where t h e pleadings present
controverted issues of fact, Judgment o n the Pleadings is inappropriate

—

the pleadings

show that there was a factual issue whether McClellan signed personally u . I U I C I i u i e .
If, in examining a motion for judgment o n the pleadings, a court looks beyond the

the parties with notice of its intention. The policy behind the rule allows the non-moving party the

The trial court abused its discretion w h e n it found that the affidavit submitted by
McClellan's attorney did not controvert Mountain America's claim that McClellan had admitted that
he signed personally on the note. Under Rule 56(f) an attorney's proffer of what will be uncovered
during discovery is sufficient t o preclude judgment until discovery can be completed.
The trial coi irt abi ised its discretion when it denier! "f> Hi < H I . mi i

iri inln mi i b i nnonsider

based on newly revealed evidence from Mountain America that the loan was secured with real

before the trial court established that the loan made to Callistoga was secured with real property

in Iron County, Utah. Although Mountain America argues that it was a junior lienholder, the facts
show that it failed to allege its junior lienholder status and prove that the foreclosure by the first
lienholdn llhiiiil rixliiiiiislipul illim1 in ill pi i if H m II, inllHtfi-il It ninii

IIII IIIIIIUI

In Inmluit,

Illbir- i . i

requirement in Utah prior to bringing an action on a promissory note secured by real property.
In addition,
position. Although there was a deed of trust foreclosed that had an earlier execution date, that
deed of trust was recorded after Mountain America had recorded its deed if tri ist

Thus

Mountain America had a priority position. When the other party foreclosed on the property
Mountain America failed to take action to protect its position as the first lienholder in the collateral.
Ii i II 111. ill in, belli ire nn

IIIIIHI

In .atisly ti iiki-niill

IIII

i In. HI

HIII

it is • >
i < mum II by nnil |

II I

>|

M-'I

I, rii-ni In

brought against a debtor, the party seeking to recover on the loan must exhaust the collateral.
As part of that requirement, the lienholder has an obligation to protect its interest in the collateralMountain America failed to do so.
The trial court abused its discretion when it refused McClellan the opportunity to
amend Ins rinswi'i In im.luilt1 n moss

IIMIMI

ri(|Hinsl

Orients,

especially when there is no trial date set or motion or discovery cut-offs and the other party is not
prejudiced

IIII ould seei i i especially appropriate here \

merely attempted

to bring a cross-claim against a co-defendant that was aware of the underlying claim ^._
therefore not prejudiced in any respect. Allowing an amendment to join a party is especially
appropriate when doing so will avoid injustice occasioned by the potential of inconsistent and
contradictory decisions.

y

VI. ARGUMENT
A

THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN GRANTING JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
WHEN MCCLELLAN'S ANSWER CLEARLY CONTROVERTED FACTS MATERIAL
TO MOUNTAIN AMERICA'S CLAIM.

Thougl i the II iislrirl Komi's IriniiHiy Zl

IMMIIUIIIHI

suggest

-

-

response to a motion for summary judgment, it in fact was entered in response to Mountain
America's motion for judgment on the pleadings filed pursuant to Rule 12(c) and decided without
oral argument. [Record 15.]
A motion for judgment on the pleadings brought by the Plaintiff to ferret out legally
insufficient defenses is governed by the same standards, as. a motion II > illisiiiiiiisfi, uiiilei Mule
12(b)(6) brought by the Defendant in response to a legally flawed complaint. Crooked Lake Dev.,

to state a claim and the Rule 12(c) motion for judgment on the pleadings are different sides of the
same coin.
In review f i

* muuoi t, mc ^oui t oil Appeals is obliged to coi istrue tl le

allegations of the answer in the light most favorable to the Defendant and to indulge all reasonable

The Defendant can win a Rule 12(b)(6) motion only if the Plaintiff could prove no set of facts in
suppor I: • »1 I l i s < l a i n i See Colman v. Utal 1 State Land Bd. 795 P.2d 622 HI III II11 flIIII II likewise, I!HE
Plaintiff can prevail on a motion for judgment on the pleadings only if i IO set of facts could be
proved by Defendant that would constitute a valid defense. 5A Wright & Miller Federal Practice
and Procedure k 1 168 at MR in (1199(11.

,j

When McClellan's answer is viewed in this light, the District Court's grant of the
motion for judgment on the pleadings must be reversed.
In response to Mountain America's allegation that "Defendants executed and
delivered to Plaintiff a promissory note or installment loan agreement," [Complaint f 2, Record 2]

loan agreement, but affirmatively asserts that his execution of that agreement was in his capacity
as the secretary of the callistoga Court Club, Inc. (Emphasis adldkxJ) [Ar iswui

• - ..

||

Further, the answer asserted:
"Second Defense Plaintiff's complaint asserts a liability for a promissory note which
is a corporate liability not personal liability, and Defendant Robert E. McClellan is
being sued personally " [Answer P 1 Record 9]
It is a defense to liability on a promissory note that the signer was signing only as

is so basic as to hardly require stating our agreement with defendants' argument that the
corporate entity is separate from themselves as individuals

dn busir ies^

|i i

it will protect them from personal liability therefore.") rherefore, it was error for the court to grant
the motion for judgment on the pleadings.

L.

IF THE DISTRICT COURT CONSIDERED MATTERS OUTSIDE THE PLEADINGS.
THE JUDGMENT MUST BE REVERSED BECAUSE MCCLELLAN WAS NOT GIVEN
AN OPPORTUNITY TO PRESENT MATERIAL EVIDENCE,
The record demonstrates that prior to entry of the January 23, 1990 order, nothing

outside the pleadings was presented to the court in support of the motion for judgment on the

pleadings.4

It was not until the hearing on McClellan's motion to set aside judgment that

Mountain America suggested, for the first time, that the order might be supported by McClellan's
answer to a request for admission.5
Under Rule 12(c) "if matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded
by the court, the motion shall be treated as one for summary judgment and disposed of as
provided in Rule 56, and all parties shall be given reasonable opportunity to present all material
made pertinent to such a motion by Rule 56." McClellan was denied this opportunity.
(i)

McClellan was given no notice that matters outside the pleadings would be
considered.

McClellan was not given any notice that matters outside the pleadings would be
considered by the court. He, along with the court, learned for the first time that Mountain America
was relying on the request for admission at the hearing on the motion to set aside the judgment.
The courts are consistent in reversing judgments that rely on matters outside the pleadings where

An affidavit of a Mr. Kevin Stevenson was submitted by Mountain America [Record 19] but it was solely
addressed to the amount of interest and principle due on the note and did not address the merits of the
claim or whether Defendants had signed only in their corporate capacities on the note.
At the hearing on the motion to set aside judgment, Mountain America's lawyer incorrectly
represented to the court that its motion for judgment on the pleadings had been based on an answer to a
request for admission, [transcript of hearing dated October 2,1990 at 10]. However, the record is clear that
the request for admission was not mentioned in any pleadings filed with the court prior to January 23,1990,
and the motion was decided without oral argument. [Record 15; 17; 35]
5

Contrary to Mountain America's assertion, the answer to the request for admission does not establish
any personal liability on McClellan's part. The request establishes, at most, that McClellan personally
delivered the note and was personally present when the note was signed by him as secretary of the
corporation. The full text of the Request is:
Request No. 1: Admit that on or about the 5th day of June, 1984, you executed
and delivered to Plaintiff a Promissory Note and Disclosure in the amount of $30,420.00 as
secretary of the corporation Callistoga Court Club, Inc. and personally, a true and correct
copy of which is attached hereto. [Record 22]
The request says nothing about whether McClellan was agreeing to personal liability when signing the note.
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adequate notice of intent to do so is not given to the party opposing the motion. Securities Credit
Corp. v. Willey 265 P.2d 422 (Ut. 1953) (reversing trial court because party opposing judgment
on the pleadings was not accorded the opportunity to controvert interrogatory answers included
in motion for judgment on the pleadings): Strand v. Associated Students of Univ. of Utah 561 P.2d
191, 193 (Ut. 1977) ("It is error to consider a motion to dismiss as a motion for summary
judgment, without giving the adverse party an opportunity to present pertinent material.")
Moreover, it is necessary that the record clearly and affirmatively demonstrate that all parties were
given a reasonable opportunity to present additional pertinent material if matters outside the
pleadings are considered. Bekins Bar V. Ranch v. Utah Farm Prod. Credit Assn 587 P.2d 151 (Ut.
1978). Here the record shows the opposite, that McClellan was not given an opportunity to
present pertinent material.
(ii)

Despite his affidavit, showing that evidence was discoverable that would
establish his defense. McClellan was not given an opportunity to pursue that
discovery.

Prior to the hearing on the motion to set aside judgment, McClellan's lawyer
provided the court with his affidavit stating that he had spoken to Mr. Hoyt, the other corporate
officer who had signed the note with Mr. McClellan, who informed him:
"that there should have been no judgment issued against either
himself or Mr. McClellan because they had signed the promissory note
in question solely as officers of the corporate maker of the note,
Callistoga Court Club.
Mr. Hoyt also informed me that the second set of signatures on the
promissory note were placed there by himself and Mr. McClellan and
that they were placed there at the direction of the officers of Horizon
Thrift and were not to represent a personal liability on the note."
[Record 83]
At the hearing, McClellan's counsel informed the court that he had been unable to
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obtain an affidavit from Mr. Hoyt. [Transcript of hearing dated October 2, 1990 at 8]. The court
rejected McClellan's affidavit on Mountain America's objection that it contained hearsay and
denied the motion to set aside judgment on the ground there was no evidence in the record to
support McClellan's defense:
"THE COURT: Why did he sign it?
MR. SHUMATE: As a corporate officer. And he was instructed to sign it by Mr.
Froyd. That's as much as I can tell Your Honor, because that's what I'm told.
MR. KENT: But that's inadmissible, and we have not even an Affidavit from Mr.
McClellan that says that.
THE COURT: No, we don't. And that's the reason I granted the Motion for
Summary Judgment.
It seems to me that although the note may read that the makers are described
above, if you - if the officers of the corporation sign it in their corporate designation and also in
their individual capacity, they are agreeing to be liable on the note.
And I - I find no other factual basis - or no other basis in the record for any other
explanation of why they signed the note, other than they were agreeing to be responsible for it.
And that's why I granted the Motion for Summary Judgment, and that is still the ruling that I'm
going to hold to.
Transcript of hearing dated October 2, 1992 at 12-13.
The problem with the court's ruling is that it afforded McClellan no opportunity, as
is required by Rule 12(c), to present the obviously pertinent material that a bank officer had
instructed Mr. Hoyt and Mr. McClellan to sign the note a second time and that the signature would
not result in personal liability.
(iii)

The affidavit of James L. Shumate should at least have been treated as a
Rule 56(f) affidavit and McClellan should have been granted an opportunity
to do discovery on the issues.

Utah Rule of Civil Procedure 56(f) allows a party the opportunity to avoid judgment
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when there are important facts that are yet to be uncovered through discovery. The Rule provides
that n[s]hould it appear from the affidavits of a party opposing the motion that he cannot for
reasons stated present by affidavit facts essential to justify his opposition, the court may refuse
the application for judgment or may order a continuance to permit affidavits to be obtained or
depositions to be taken or discovery to be had or may make such other order as is just." Utah
R. Civ. Pro. 56(f). The rule is intended to prevent a court from making a decision where the party
opposing the motion for judgment has been unable to adequately present its evidence in
opposition to the motion for judgment. Without this procedure, there is a "danger of founding
judgment in favor of one party upon his own version of the facts. . . . "

Strand v. Associated

Students of University of Utah, 561 P.2d at 194.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that motions under Rule 56(f) should be liberally
treated. Strand. 561 P.2d 191, 194-95 (Utah 1984). It has also held that an important factor to
be considered is whether the evidence sought is specific, rather than merely a request to conduct
a "fishing expedition" in discovery. Cox v. Winters, 678 P.2d 313 (Utah 1984). The trial court
should also determine whether the non-moving party has had an opportunity to controvert the
assertions made by the party seeking judgment through the discovery process. J d ; Strand. 561
P.2d at 194.
In both Strand and Cox, the Utah Supreme Court found that the refusal to allow
additional discovery based on the affidavit was an abuse of discretion. Cox v. Winters. 678 P.2d
311, 315 (Utah 1987) Strand v. Associated Students of University of Utah. 561 P.2d 191, 194
(Utah 1977). In reaching these decisions, the Court stressed that the information that was sought
was specific and that discovery had not yet been completed.
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Similarly, in this case, McClellan's attorney, in his affidavit and at argument before
the court, asserted that specific evidence was available through further discovery and that it would
controvert Mountain America's basis for summary judgment. At the hearing, McClellan's attorney
reiterated this position that:
"at the time of the execution of the note, the additional signatures were
put on there at the instruction of Mr. Froyd of Horizon Thrift, who was
the plaintiff's predecessor in interest, and that those signatures were
not intended to be personal guarantees."
Transcript Hearing of October 3, 1990 at p. 6
and indicated that he was unable to "get a hold of Mr. Hoyt to get an Affidavit signed." [Trans.
Hearing Oct. 3, 1990 p.8]
Although technically Shumate's affidavit and statement in court is not in the form of
a Rule 56(f) affidavit, it is the functional equivalent of such an affidavit. The Affidavit clearly puts
the court on notice that there is evidence that specifically contradicts Mountain America's position
and that extra time and discovery would allow McClellan to establish that fact. The fact that the
affidavit is not labeled a Rule 56(f) affidavit is not a fatal flaw. The Utah Supreme Court has
indicated that it will be controlled by the substance of the pleadings, not the captions that are
used to describe the contents. See e.g.. Gallardo v. Bolinder. 800 P.2d 816, 817 (Utah 1990);
Armstrong Rubber Co. v. Bastian. 657 P.2d 1346, 1348 (Utah 1983). In addressing this very
issue, the Utah Court of Appeals held that an affidavit that was not properly labeled as a Rule 56(f)
affidavit, would be considered as such because the "substance of the affidavit suggests it was
intended to be [a rule 56(f) affidavit]." Downtown Athletic Club. 740 P.2d 275, 278-79 n.2 (Ut.
1987).
There was evidence available that upon further discovery would have specifically
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controverted Mountain America's claim that McClellan was personally liable on the note. That
evidence was brought to the court's attention through Mr. Shumate's very specific affidavit which
should not have been ignored by the court. This matter should be remanded to the district court
to allow McClellan to obtain the evidence from Hoyt and to conduct further discovery from the
officer of the Horizon First Thrift, Mr. Froyd.

VII.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO RECONSIDER THE
INTERLOCUTORY ORDER ENTERED AGAINST MCCLELLAN WHEN THE RECORD
SHOWED THAT MOUNTAIN AMERICA FAILED TO EXHAUST REAL PROPERTY
COLLATERAL THAT SECURED THE LOAN PRIOR TO FILING SUIT AGAINST THE
SIGNERS OF THE PROMISSORY NOTE.
The trial court erred in refusing to reconsider the judgment, even though a final

judgment had not been entered, when presented with evidence that would preclude Mountain
America from recovering against McClellan6.
Mountain America brought this action against Hoyt and McClellan as alleged makers
of the Callistoga note, without first attempting to exhaust the real property collateral that secured
the loan. Affidavit of Blake S. Atkin dated November 11, 1991 [Record 142] The issue came to
the court's attention when McClellan's counsel filed a motion to reconsider on November 11,
1991. [Record 138] Along with the motion, McClellan's counsel filed an affidavit wherein he
asserted that he had learned of the real property security arrangement from Mountain America's

6

Although the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for a motion to reconsider, by
implication Rule 54(b) allows such a motion in cases involving multiple parties. See Salt Lake City Corp.
v. James Const. Inc., 761 P.2d 42, 44 n.5 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). The Utah courts, as well as others, have
noted on a number of occasions that it is proper for a trial court to review a decision and change its
decision prior to its final entry. See e.g. Bennionv. Hansen. 699 P.2d 757, 760 (Utah 1985)(citing McCollum
v. Clothier. 121 Utah 311, 320, 241 P.2d 468, 472 (1952): Chapman v. Jesco. Inc.. 98 N.M. 707, 709, 652
P.2d 257, 259 (1982): Johnson v. Whitman. 1 Wash.App. 540, 541, 463 P.2d 207, 209 (1969)): Williams v.
Barber. 765 P.2d 887, 891 (Utah 1988) J., Zimmerman, concurring in result: see also In re Blalock. 233 N.C
493, 64 S.E.2d 848, 858 (1951): McKee v. William. 741 P.2d 978, 980-81 (Utah Ct. App. 1987).
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counsel for the first time on November 7,1991. [Record 142] In all its pleadings, the Plaintiff had
failed to inform the court or Defendant that the note had been secured by real estate.
Utah has adopted a one-action rule in cases where loans are secured with real
property. See D. Milner. Real Property Collateral: The "One-Action" Rule in Action. 1991 Utah L
Rev. 557, 557. The Rule provides: "There can be one action for the recovery of any debt or the
enforcement of any right secured solely by mortgage upon real estate which action must be in
accordance with the provision of this chapter." Utah Code Ann. §78-37-1.
The one-action rule requires the creditor to exhaust the real property collateral prior
to taking any action to collect on the loan. In the words of the Court in First Nat'l Bank of
Coalville v. Boley. 90 Utah 341, 61 P.2d 621, 623 (1936): "Under [the one-action rule] there is no
personal liability on the part of mortgagor until after foreclosure or sale of the security and then
only for the deficiency then remaining unpaid; a mortgagee may not have a personal judgment
against the mortgagor until the security has first been exhausted. That position has been
reaffirmed in a number of subsequent decisions. See e.g.. Lockhart Co. v. Equitable Realty Co..
657 P.2d 1333 (Utah 1983).
Thus, in this case, because Mountain America failed to take any action against the
property, it is precluded from taking action against the signers of the note, as a matter of law.
A.

Mountain America cannot claim the junior lienholder exception to the one
action rule.

In opposition to McClellan's motion to reconsider, Mountain America appears to
have taken the position that this case fits within an exception to the one-action rule as found in
Cache Valley Banking Co. v. Logan. 88 Utah 577, 56 P.2d 1046 (1936), although no reference to
the exception is made in Mountain America's motion. In Cache Valley, the Court found that where
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the position of the secured party was that of a junior creditor there was no need to bring an action
on the property, if the senior creditor had already exhausted the collateral. Jd. at 1049 (emphasis
added).
However, the Court has strictly limited the scope of the exception and created
important, required burdens of pleading and proof before the exception applies. In Lockhart Co.
v. Equitable Realty. Inc.. 657 P.2d 1333,1336 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme Court held that prior
to claiming a junior lienholder exception the lienholder had to make a "proper allegation and proof
. . . that the security has become valueless." Jd. If the junior lienholder does not make an
adequate showing that the collateral is without value, the lienholder "is precluded by the 'oneaction rule' from pursuing his action on the note." Jd. Here, Mountain America has failed to show
anything in the record where it has alleged or proved the exhaustion of the collateral. Indeed,
there is no evidence in the record that the property had been foreclosed on and that it was
without value.

In fact, McClellan was not aware of the security's continued existence until

Mountain America's new attorney informed him of the security in late 1991. Without the allegation
and the proof that the property was valueless, Mountain America's action against McClellan must
be dismissed as a matter of law.
B.

Mountain America was not in fact a junior lienholder but was in first position
and let the collateral slip through its hands.

Mountain America's lienholder position was in fact that of a senior creditor. [Affidavit
of Blake S. Atkin in Support of McClellan's Motion to Reconsider and Set Aside Judgment dated
December 4, 1991, Record 181].

Mountain America erroneously assumed that Zion's First

National Bank had a priority lien against the property. However, Zion's deed of trust contained
an erroneous description of the property. And although Zion's received its deed first in time, it
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was filed incorrectly. Mountain America then recorded its deed of trust correctly. Sometime after
Mountain America recorded its deed, Zion's corrected the error in the title description. [Affidavit
of Blake S. Atkin dated December 4,1991 at 5 3. Record 181] However, because Utah is a racenotice jurisdiction for the purpose of recording of property deeds, the first trust deed to be
properly recorded has priority even though it may have been granted subsequent in time. See
Utah Code Ann. S57-3-3: Neeley v. Kelsch. 600 P.2d 979, (Utah 1979): Kemp v. Zion's First Nat'l
Bank. 470 P.2d 390, (Utah 1970). Thus, Mountain America's trust deed has priority over the trust
deed foreclosed by Zion's.
Zion's recognized this legal principal in the trustees deed it issued at the foreclosure.
The trustees deed states: "Whereas Callistoga Court Club by deed of trust dated March 8,1984
and recorded February 19, 1988..." [Affidavit of Blake S. Atkin dated December 4, 1991, Exhibit
B, Record 188]. Thus, even Zion's conceded its priority date to be February 19,1988, some four
years after Mountain America's trust deed was recorded.
Thus Mountain America failed or neglected to protect its interest in the collateral and
to foreclose on its priority position precluding its claim under the one action rule.

VIII.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO ALLOW
MCCLELLAN TO AMEND HIS ANSWER TO INCLUDE A CROSS CLAIM AGAINST
HOYT AND THIRD PARTY CLAIMS.
McClellan attempted to amend his answer to include a cross claim against Hoyt who

was already a party to the proceeding and to receive leave of court to file third party complaints
against non-parties who were shareholders of Callistoga. Because the trial court has discretion
whether to allow an amendment to the pleadings, this Court reviews the trial court's action under
an abuse of discretion standard. Girard v. Appleby. 660 P.2d 245, 248 (Utah 1983).
20

Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 13(f) authorizes a party to plead a "cross-claim . . .
against a co-party arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter of the
original transaction..." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 13(f). Rule 15 provides that "a party may amend his [or
her] pleading only by leave of court or by written consent of the adverse party; and leave shall
be freely given when justice so requires." Utah R. Civ. Pro. 15. As a general proposition, the rule
tends to favor granting a leave to amend a pleading. See e.g.. Westley v. Farmer's Ins. Exch..
663 P.2d 93, (Utah 1983). In determining when an amendment is proper, the court's primary
consideration is whether a party has an opportunity to defend against the claim and whether any
party receives an unfair advantage by the amendment. Bekins Bar V Ranch v. Huth. 664 P.2d
455 (Utah 1983). Courts are much less likely to grant an amendment when the amendment will
delay the adjudication of the case. See Girard v. Appleby. 660 P.2d 245 (Utah 1983); Hein's
Turkey Hatcheries. Inc. v. Nephi Processing Plant. Inc.. 24 Utah 2d 271, 470 P.2d 257 (Utah
1970).
Here, there was no reason for the trial court to deny McClellan's motion for leave
to amend and bring a cross-claim against Hoyt. There was no trial date established, no discovery
cutoff established and no motion cutoff established. Second, Hoyt was not prejudiced in any way.
Hoyt's liability, if any, is predicated on the exact facts and documents as McClellan's. In that
regard, Hoyt knew of the issues and was prepared to defend against them. Any defense that
Hoyt had prepared against Mountain America would be equally effective against McClellan. Third,
joining Hoyt might well have prevented another trip before the court in another lawsuit based on
contribution. Finally, without the cross-claim, there is a possibility that McClellan will be forced to
bear an unfair burden of the judgment, in the event this Court rules against him. It is likely that
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Hoyt will assert claims of res judicata and collateral estoppel against McClellan in any suit for a
right of contribution. Even if McClellan can successfully defeat these claims, he will have suffered
through the emotional turmoil of another set of judicial proceedings, not to mention the additional
litigation expenses. In short, the refusal to allow the motion to amend to include a cross-claim will
only increase the costs to the litigants and subject McClellan to the possibility of inconsistent
judgments on the same facts.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the court's January 23,1990 judgment, its December 27,
1991 order denying McClellan's motion to reconsider, and denying McClellan's request to file a
cross claim and third party claims, should be reversed and this case remanded to the District
Court for further proceedings.
Respectfully submitted this

day of May, 1992.
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